Water pollution taxes, or effluent fees, have long been advocated by environmental economists as a regulatory approach to cost effectively achieve water quality improvements.
control costs. This is a significant distributional difference that may explain the political demise of effluent tax policies.
A greater focus of this article, however, is on the institutional challenges presented by, and the efficiency of, effluent taxes. Depending on the type of system imposed, taxes do not guarantee more efficient outcomes than more standard forms of regulation. And, leaving politics aside, it can be institutionally demanding to put in place a system of effluent fees guaranteed to produce markedly better outcomes than more conventional systems of regulation. But, despite these difficulties, there remains a strong set of arguments for the use of taxes to control water pollution. The article will explore both the challenges and opportunities of a tax system. In particular, we will characterize the informational and institutional barriers to successful implementation of water quality taxes.
A distinguishing feature of the water quality problem is that environmental damagesthat is, the costs to society of pollution-are highly dependent on the location of pollution sources in the hydrological, social, and economic landscape. First, the demand for water quality varies from location to location. Some waterbodies are envisioned as pristine, where recreation and species support is the overriding concern. Other waterbodies, such as those in urban areas where industrial effluent and development-related runoff are practical facts of life, serve a more complex set of objectives. Second, a source's location determines the way in which pollution ultimately affects surface waters. The transport, diffusion, and cross-pollutant interactions of releases are highly idiosyncratic to location. Upstream releases may be worse than downstream releases, because upstream pollution affects a longer stretch of the river course. Riparian releases will tend to be worse than inland releases since there is a more direct hydrological connection between the pollution and surface waters. Natural degradation and chemical interactions are also highly landscape-dependent. For these reasons, uniform taxes may not satisfy water quality objectives or-putting it the other way around-if used to satisfy quality objectives, may not yield minimum aggregate control costs. Spatial issues arise in most environmental tax contexts. They are particularly important in the case of water quality, however, because the transport and deposition of water pollutants are dependent upon a particularly complex set of forces that are difficult to measure and model.
We will explore these political, institutional, and economic issues in more detail by reviewing the literature on effluent taxes, the limited international experience with imposing such taxes, and the current state of water quality regulation in the United States.
The Existing Approach to Water Quality Regulation
Before turning to a description of effluent taxes, it is useful to briefly describe the status quo approach to regulation: command-and-control effluent reduction requirements. 2 The centerpiece of U.S. water quality regulation is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program. The NPDES program requires polluters to obtain permits, or licenses, to discharge. These permits specify pollution amounts that can be legally discharged.
The limits are determined by reference to the "best conventional" control technology or "best economically achievable" control technology, depending on the type of pollutant. The control technology standard in turn typically generates numerical concentration and aggregate volume limits. Limits may also take the form of "allowable discharges per unit" of a facility's production. It is these numerical limits that are binding. The actual technology used to achieve these numerical standards is up to the polluter. For our purposes, the essential characteristic of this system is that it sets numerical, quantity-based limits on pollution. We refer to this system as the "effluent standards approach."
It is important to note that NPDES permits are only required of so-called "point sources."
Point sources tend to be larger industrial and commercial facilities and public treatment facilities.
Some large agricultural operations are considered point sources, but, by and large, runoff from farms, roads, lawns, and most small pollution sources are not directly regulated. These "nonpoint sources" are the subject of increased scrutiny, since most of the nation's remaining water quality problems are due to nonpoint pollution.
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In addition to the technology-based standards described above, regulation can impose additional controls on point sources if the waterbody to which discharges occur is in violation of state water quality standards. Accordingly, these ambient water quality standards are a second line of defense if baseline standards fail to achieve water quality goals. This tightening of permit conditions only works, however, if point sources are the source of the water quality violation. If nonpoint sources are to blame, some other mechanism must be called into play. This is one rationale for the so-called Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program. A long-neglected aspect of the Clean Water Act (CWA), TMDL provisions require states to identify waters that are not in compliance with water quality standards, establish priorities, and implement improvements-including improvements that rely on nonpoint source reductions.
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In the future, the TMDL approach and the need to control nonpoint sources are likely to expand the nature of regulation. The nature of the nation's water quality problems make this almost inevitable, though many legal, technical, and political hurdles remain to be cleared.
Starting from the in situ quality of waterbodies themselves and working backwards to address threats to quality sounds like simple common sense. It is, but it is not how one would describe the current regulatory system. The focus of the current system is on specific numeric discharge limits applied to a precisely defined universe of pollution sources. The quality of surface waters themselves is a binding regulatory issue only if quality is adequately monitored and if point sources are found to be the source of the problem.
Effluent taxes could play an important role in reducing nonpoint pollution and in improving the efficiency of point source control activities in the future. History offers a cautionary note, however. The idea of using effluent taxes to achieve compliance with ambient water quality standards is not new to the political arena or economic analysis. A review of this history is therefore instructive.
Effluent Tax Proposals: A Brief History
The Water Quality Act of 1965 (WQA) was the first major statutory attempt to address the nation's growing water quality problems. The Act proved to be a weak basis for enforcement authority, but did yield one major improvement: the development of ambient water quality standards. States were called upon to set their own standards and given flexibility to determine how standards would be met. The Act's major weakness was that it gave no concrete authority to force effluent reductions by specific polluters. 5 It was relatively straightforward to determine if ambient standards were being violated, but much more difficult to determine who was at fault.
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At the same time, however, economists were proposing effluent taxes as a policy that could both generate incentives to meet ambient quality targets and minimize the costs of doing so. 7 Moreover, proponents of effluent fees received a receptive hearing in the political arena. For this, credit is due to a set of economists and water quality engineers who were actively exploring the application of taxes to the problems of large, polluted watersheds. In the mid-1960s, large studies of the Delaware River Estuary were undertaken to assess, among other things, the desirability of using effluent charges to control pollutants. In 1967, Johnson reported that a "zoned" effluent charge program (where different tax levels were applied in different zones along the estuary) would cost half as much as a "uniform treatment" regulation. 10 Based on their own analysis of the Delaware Estuary, Kneese and Bower strongly advocated the use of charges for the same set of reasons: "The effluent charges procedure would have the advantage over other possible techniques of permitting each waste discharger to adjust in the most efficient way for his particular circumstances." 11 They went on to argue that systems of charges, in conjunction with basin-wide approaches to water quality management, "may properly be viewed as a central tool of water quality management. We feel that regional water quality management agencies should be provided with this tool."
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It is also interesting to note that these studies took a broad, regional approach to water quality problems and acknowledged the role of not just industrial sources, but nonpoint sources as well. In this respect, the work was particularly far-sighted. Unfortunately, the institutions necessary to implement regional approaches did not exist at that time. 13 Current water quality regulation, as exemplified by the TMDL program, is returning to watershed-level, multi-source analysis of water quality impairments. In the intervening years, however, water quality regulation took a more intermediate set of steps, focusing on direct quantity restrictions imposed on large point sources.
With the passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) in 1972, the hope that effluent fees would be applied faded considerably. The FWPCA established the NPDES permitting system and its associated uniform treatment provisions. The government's choice of uniform technology-based standards was understandable, given prevailing frustrations with enforcement. But it effectively put an end to serious discussion of effluent fees as an alternative.
The problem with the WQA lay in the implementation plans for ambient quality improvements.
In particular, it was difficult to enforce specific reductions by specific polluters. 14 This failure generated a strong desire on the part of regulators and the concerned public to mandate facility-specific reductions. The FWPCA's permit-generated uniform treatment standards directly addressed that desire. According to a history of the legislation: Treatment requirements imposed on individual firms were seen as the most direct response to pollution problems. In the climate of the early 1970s, and given the lack of regional institutions in place, the desire to minimize compliance costs and use taxes to meet ambient goals was less strongly felt. This is one explanation for the quantity-based regulatory system we have in place to this day. To understand some of the other explanations, it is necessary to describe the characteristics of a tax system in more detail.
Before doing so, mention should also be made of the European experience with effluent In theory, a tax-based policy and a command-and-control quantity standard can both achieve the efficient outcome. 23 With knowledge of the costs and benefits of pollution control, a regulator can simply require firms to engage in the efficient level of control. The efficient level of control can be directly mandated, say via a permit requiring a certain level of treatment.
Alternatively, an effluent tax can be applied, with increases in the rate if control is inadequate and reductions if the tax is excessive. Both instruments can generate the efficient, "first-best" outcome. 24 Unfortunately, the equivalence of the two instruments, and their ability to generate the efficient outcome, break down in the face of real-world constraints. Perhaps the most important of these constraints is that regulators have limited information regarding both firmspecific control costs and the benefits arising from reduced emissions. When this informational constraint is taken into account, policy goals change.
For the first-best outcome to be achieved, different pollution sources must be held to source-specific levels of control or be assigned source-specific tax levels. This is true because the costs and benefits of control are unique to each facility. Technologies, locations, and other circumstances differ in important respects from one facility to the next. In practice, however, we cannot expect a regulator to easily determine these differences. It is very difficult to externally measure, or even infer, firms' control costs. It is also difficult to determine the social benefits of controls, since the benefits (i.e., the damages avoided) are often diffuse and are typically not reflected in easily observable prices. 25 For these reasons, the efficient, first-best policy outcome is not the relevant benchmark. Instead, a more pragmatic question motivates the analysis of policy: namely, what is the best way to achieve a minimum level of ambient water quality in a waterbody? This is a "second-best" policy question because it abandons the goal of finding the most efficient outcome. Achieving ambient standards is a more limited and realistic goal. As noted earlier, states must establish, with federal oversight, surface water quality standards.
Taking these standards as given, and ignoring the question of whether the standards themselves are efficient, we now turn to ways in which standards can be met at minimum cost.
This problem has been the focus of much of the economic literature on water quality.
Because benefits are so difficult to measure, economists have long argued that the second-best problem is the most relevant one, at least as far as water quality policy is concerned. 26 In the words of Baumol and Oates, "It is hard to be sanguine about the availability in the foreseeable future of a comprehensive body of statistics reporting the marginal net damage of the various externality-generating activities in the economy." 27 In contrast to the first-best goal, the ambient standard goal does not require the regulator or policy analyst to know the social marginal benefits of individual firms' effluent controls. All that need be known is whether a given waterbody meets its quality standard.
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Regulators also lack good information about control costs. Ideally, a regulator would tailor taxes or quantity standards on the basis of facilities' control costs, so that facilities reduce pollution by different amounts. But this is impractical. In the words of Kneese and Schultze, "In practice, the need to tailor limits to each firm, and to consider for each the cost and effectiveness of all of the available alternatives for reducing pollution, would be an impossible task. There are up to 55,000 major sources of industrial water pollution alone. A regulatory agency cannot know the technological opportunities, the alternative raw materials, and the kinds of products available for every firm in every industry."
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Targeted fees or control standards tailored to the control costs and benefits of individual facilities-while efficient-are impractical from a real-world regulatory standpoint.
If taxes and standards cannot be targeted, what is the alternative? The alternative is uniform taxes and standards that apply to a range of facilities. Accordingly, economists have turned much of their attention to these more realistic alternatives. The literature compares two broad types of policy, the so-called "charges and standards" approach and a "uniform treatment" approach. Under the charges approach, a uniform tax is applied to a set of polluters, with the tax level set high enough to induce aggregate effluent reductions adequate to meet an ambient water quality standard. 30 Under the uniform treatment approach, all firms are required to reduce emissions by an equal percentage or amount, sufficient to meet an ambient standard. The uniform treatment policy roughly corresponds to the permit system currently in place in the United States. When these two, more practical policies are compared, taxes appear to be significantly preferable.
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Taxes are preferable because they are flexible in a way that mandated reductions are not.
With a tax system, not all facilities have to reduce pollution by the same amount. Because facilities differ in their control costs, this flexibility is important. Under a tax scheme, highcontrol-cost firms abate less and low-control-cost firms abate more. In aggregate, this means that a given level of ambient water quality can be achieved more cheaply than if all firms abate the same amount. As an example, assume that two facilities contribute to water pollution in a lake and that, for the lake's water quality to meet state standards, six units of pollution need to be eliminated.
If the facilities' control costs are as described in Table 1 , we can easily compare the tax and uniform treatment policies. A uniform treatment policy requires each firm to abate three units of pollution. The aggregate cost of complying with the uniform treatment policy is therefore $180:
$60 for Firm 1, and $120 for Firm 2. Now consider an effluent tax equal to $45. With the tax, the two firms do not make the same abatement decisions. At that price, Firm 1 abates four units (because the marginal abatement cost of those units is less than the pollution price) and Firm 2 abates two units (for the same reason). In total, six units are abated, which meets the ambient goal. But note that the total cost of abatement, $160, is now lower. 32 This savings is the benefit of a tax mechanism. Also note that the regulator need know nothing about the firms' respective control costs to achieve this result. The tax can simply be iteratively raised (or lowered) until the water quality goal is met. It is in this sense that "effluent fees … tend to elicit the proper responses even in the absence of an omniscient regulatory agency." 
So Why Not Taxes?
Given their virtues, we now turn to the question of why taxes are not more widely applied in practice. 34 Broadly, there are two classes of explanation. First, taxes are politically unpopular, with opposition arising-for different reasons-from both the regulated and environmental communities. Second, the economists' argument that charges yield lower aggregate control costs than standards is not in fact always true. Under certain circumstances, a price-based approach can yield higher aggregate control costs than a uniform treatment approach. The reasons this is true are important to the design of any water quality regulation, and so we give them special attention in the following section. But, as a result, economists cannot say that charges are always more efficient than uniform treatment standards. This complication undermines the clarity of the policy prescription.
Political Objections
Political opposition to taxes as a control instrument comes from two quarters: the regulated firms themselves and environmental interests wary of the flexibility inherent in a pricebased approach. To understand why regulated firms may oppose tax schemes, consider again But, in addition, both firms must pay the tax on all units of pollution they do not abate. The total compliance cost is therefore significantly greater. For example, Firm 1 will pay the $45 tax on the two units it doesn't abate, bringing its total compliance cost to $190 ($100+$90). Firm 2 will pay the tax on the 4 units it doesn't abate, bringing its total to $240 ($60+180). These tax revenues can be used, in principle, to offset the social cost of pollution the firms continue to emit. 35 Taxes shift pollution costs onto the polluters. This is socially desirable but can also be costly to firms if they cannot pass the tax on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
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Standards can also deter (or disadvantage) the entry of new firms and facilities if new sources are held to higher standards than old sources, as they often are. From the standpoint of existing firms, this is an advantage.
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Environmentalists have resisted the use of charges on both ethical and pragmatic grounds. The ethical complaint stems from resistance to the flexibility inherent in the charge concept-not all firms have to abate the same amount. In the words of Bohm and Russell, "the polluter's ability to choose how to react to a charge, the heart of the economist's efficiency case, is also the heart of the environmentalist's opposition." 38 Also, the idea of putting a price on pollution may be symbolically unattractive to some-despite the fact that it is the polluter who pays the price.
Pragmatic opposition arises from fears that a system of charges is administratively and legally more difficult to implement, and thus subject to more potential abuse by presumably well-connected polluters. 39 This critique argues that the legal basis for defining appropriate charges is weaker and the challenges associated with monitoring compliance are greater. As for taxes' legal basis, it is true that existing U.S. water quality regulations provide a more sound legal basis for uniform treatment standards than for charge-based systems. But that is because the regulations themselves are not designed to implement charges. 40 In principle, it is unclear why a charge-based system cannot be made legally sound-if the political will is present to do so. Others focus on the administrative challenge. In the words of one such critic, "Who is going to fix the charges, and how great are the chances that charges will be set higher or lower than some optimal level to satisfy the self-interest of particular interest groups?" 41 Of course, the same criticism can be leveled against the administrative procedures associated with setting appropriate treatment requirements. The difficulty is clearly present, but it is unclear why charge-setters would be more prone than standard-setters to ignore the public interest.
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A similar argument applies to the monitoring of uniform treatment and tax systems.
Effluent charges require continuous monitoring so that the tax can be applied to actual discharges. Consider the following description of the monitoring problem: "These measurements are complicated not only by the features of invisibility and inherent 'fugitiveness' … but by the variability of discharges with production levels, equipment malfunctions and operator actions; by the imprecision of measurement devices and the discrete sampling techniques used in many such devices; and by the awkwardness involved in obtaining entry to a discharger's premises and setting up elaborate equipment in order to take the samples." 43 This seems to place tax-based systems at a disadvantage, since under current treatment-based approaches, continuous monitoring of effluent rarely occurs. Instead, the focus is on sporadic monitoring of installed treatment technology and effluent concentrations-which is easier to do.
This draws the wrong conclusion, however. The fact that continuous monitoring rarely occurs under treatment-based systems is a significant weakness in the implementation of that approach. 44 Monitoring the simple installation of a treatment technology is certainly easier than continuous monitoring. But it is also far less effective. Ideally, treatment systems should also feature comprehensive monitoring to ensure that treatment standards are being met on a continuous basis. 45 Again, the argument is not that effluent fee monitoring is easy, but that the monitoring challenge is no less significant under a treatment approach.
The 'Transport Problem'
When a pollutant is released, its impact on the environment depends on numerous factors.
Pollutants deposited on land, such as pesticides and fertilizers, are carried into surface waters by runoff. Runoff is determined by climatic conditions, in particular rainfall, and by the geology of the region, including soil types and elevation gradients. Some of the pollution will degrade naturally, some will be deposited in soils and groundwater, and some will impair surface waters.
The fate of pollutants deposited directly into surface waters is similarly complex. Once introduced, a pollutant's contribution to impairment is a function of the waterbody's assimilative capacity (which is itself a function of climatic conditions), salinity, acidity, and other localized chemical characteristics. 46 The hydrology of the waterbody affects the mixing and transport of the pollutant. Depending on the location of a release, and the nature of the pollutant, some pollutants will remain in-stream for long periods of time, while others will quickly degrade or be flushed from the system. This means that similar releases in different geographic contexts can have markedly different environmental consequences. 47 In principle, these spatial relationships can be described in a systematic way. Hydrological systems can be characterized and described in formal terms.
The better the description, the better are predictions of how a given release will effect a particular waterbody. Transport models describe these relationships. 48 In the words of one water systems analyst, "the relationship between the quality of water and the contiguous environment is essentially the domain of mathematical models." 49 Whether or not these models are practical and within the reach of contemporary science and regulatory budgets is an open question. Such models attempt to depict an inescapable reality, however-namely, that the social consequences of pollutant discharges depend on the geographic context of the discharge.
In the simplest terms, transport models divide the landscape into zones and define a matrix of transport coefficients associated with each zone. These coefficients take the form of parameters a ij , where each a ij describes the impact of a unit of pollution released in zone i on surface water in zone j. 50 With a complete matrix, the transport of pollutants within a larger geographic area, such as a watershed, can be holistically described. A simple two-zone transport matrix might look like Table 2 , where releases in a particular zone have a direct, one-to-one impact on that zone's water quality, but a lesser impact on the other zone's water quality.
A corollary implication of Table 2 is that units of pollution that are controlled (eliminated) in one zone will not yield a one-to-one improvement in ambient water quality in another zone. Pollution controlled in Zone 1 will directly improve Zone 1's water quality. The benefits will be less, however, in Zone 2.
How do transport problems affect the desirability and implementation of effluent charges? In a first-best world, the transport model is used to calculate the marginal social damages of a facility's pollution. A transport model is necessary because it describes the way in which actual pollution results in actual social damages in the broader landscape. But, clearly, the informational challenge posed by this activity is immense. 51 Even in a second-best world, where we seek a minimum-cost policy for achieving an ambient water quality standard, a transport model is necessary. The prescription in this case is to weight each firm's pollution by its impact on ambient water quality (perhaps in another zone). The least cost solution is arrived at only if each firm is induced to control its emissions to the point where marginal costs per weighted unit of pollution are equated across firms. 52 In practice, this means effluent charges that are not uniform across facilities, but are tailored to the transport characteristics of individual facilities.
Effluent tax schemes that account for the transport problem retain their desirability: namely, they lead to unambiguously lower control costs than treatment standards. Unfortunately, locational differences are quite difficult to take into account, and facility-specific taxes are administratively complex to implement. 53 According to the U.S. EPA, a key challenge facing agencies is "the lack of highly developed, scientifically sound approaches to identify problems in watersheds and to predict the results of potential control actions on water quality. While a wide variety of models are available, each comes with limitations on its use, applicability, and predictive capabilities." 54 But these are precisely the kinds of models necessary to do effective tax targeting. So what about uniform charges? Can we still say they are preferable to uniform treatment? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is that "it depends." The unfortunate fact is that when transport phenomena are taken into account, tax schemes do not necessarily outperform even a crudely applied treatment standard approach.
The argument for charges over treatment standards is powerful and unambiguous until transport-related complexities are introduced. When they are, a potentially troubling ambiguity emerges. As noted by Rose-Ackerman in her 1973 critique of effluent charges: "When these complexities are recognized, it becomes apparent that, in any concrete application, an operational effluent charge may be a less efficient means of controlling pollution than a comparable nonmarket regulatory device." 55 Rose-Ackerman analyzed the realistic, second-best world where regulators lack facility-specific information about control costs and social damages-and therefore can apply only a uniform, nontargeted charge. In that world, effluent fees can result in higher aggregate control costs than uniform treatment rules.
TABLE 3
An example illustrates this possibility. Table 3 is much like Table 1 , showing the marginal and total costs of pollution control for two firms. In this example, however, we consider the different effects of the two firms' pollution on an impaired water segment.
Referring to induces too little abatement. The total cost of the uniform tax is $150 ($120 + $30). Note the cost of the uniform tax is significantly higher than the cost of the uniform treatment standard.
Taxes do not necessarily outperform rigid treatment standards. This is the conclusion of a more complex-and realistic-model that depicts the realities of pollutant transport. More specifically, uniform taxes applied to nonuniform sources are not necessarily more efficient than treatment standards. It is very important to emphasize that targeted taxes-taxes based on individual facilities' effects on ambient water quality-do not suffer from this ambiguity. They remain clearly preferable to quantity-based standards. Uniformity is the source of the ambiguity.
Tax uniformity is a deal with the devil. Uniformity makes implementation easier, but at a reduction in efficiency. 58 Under certain circumstances, the reduction in efficiency can erode the benefits of taxes to the point where even rigid quantity-based treatment standards are preferable.
Empirical analysis confirms that this kind of outcome is a realistic possibility. An empirical analysis of alternative policies applied (again) to the Delaware Estuary showed that a uniform tax was more costly than a uniform treatment standard.
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This conclusion must be placed in its proper perspective, however. The example generated above, and the general class of cases where taxes underperform treatment standards, arise only in a special set of circumstances. What is distinctive about the above example is that the high-cost facility (Facility 2) is also the high-benefit facility, in the sense that its emissions reductions more effectively improve water quality. Facility 2's reductions generate one-for-one reductions in Zone 2's water pollution. Facility 1's reductions generate only one-fifth of these benefits. Two offsetting effects create this situation. On one hand, Facility 2 should abate less because it is the high-cost abater. On the other hand, Facility 2 should abate more because it's the high-benefit abater. In the example, the two effects closely match and it is desirable for the two firms to abate similar amounts. This accounts for the uniform-treatment approach being the more efficient.
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A hybrid approach to effluent taxes can minimize the loss in efficiency that can arise from uniformity. In particular, taxes can be targeted not to specific facilities, but to classes of facilities that feature broadly similar control costs. And taxes can be targeted to different geographic zones. For example, a particular tax rate can be uniformly applied to large industrial facilities that release directly into a waterbody. A different tax can be applied to small sources that are more hydrologically isolated from water impairments. This kind of tax "zoning" can dramatically improve the performance of effluent charges, and at a reasonable implementation cost.
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With a zoned system, confidence in the relative efficiency of a tax approach is restored.
And even economists who emphasize the danger of naively applying tax schemes do not conclude that, on balance, more rigid approaches are preferable. 62 There is simply too much theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that significant efficiencies will arise with the use of a price-based policy. Empirical analyses of cost savings from incentive-based approaches (including both tax and trading schemes) typically find them to be significant. 
Doomed to Failure?
U.S. water quality regulation is undergoing a significant shift toward watershed-level, water-quality-driven controls on the widest range of sources, including nonpoint sources.
Because nonpoint sources represent the most significant unaddressed challenge in the water quality area, the potential use of taxes as a means to control nonpoint pollution deserves more attention than has been given to it in this short review. 64 The preceding discussion has focused on emissions taxes-i.e., taxes on pollution actually released. This presupposes that pollution can be measured, if imperfectly, at the point of release. That assumption becomes less and less reasonable as the focus shifts to nonpoint sources. After all, monitoring numerous small, and sometimes mobile, nonpoint sources looms as a large practical challenge. Accordingly, much analysis of nonpoint pollution control taxes focuses on the inputs to polluting activities rather than the outputs of that activity. 65 For example, it may be more practical to tax fertilizer and pesticide sales than to tax the runoff created by the use of such products.
Nonpoint sources also generate what are called "time varying discharges." As the term suggests, these discharges have an episodic, unpredictable nature. For example, nonpoint releases can spike as a result of storms that generate increased runoff and surface water flows.
These spikes cannot be ignored or "averaged away" since they can have disproportionately significant impacts on environmental quality. And time varying discharges introduce uncertainty into ambient and source-specific monitoring protocols and increase the importance of continuous, rather than random, monitoring. They also confuse the relationship between control activities and ambient water quality outcomes. Nonpoint sources fear this confusion because it increases the regulatory risks they might face if called on to build in margins of safety adequate to insure against any episodic violation of standards. These characteristics do not necessarily disadvantage taxes relative to uniform approaches to nonpoint pollution. Monitorable treatment standards featuring margins of safety adequate to guard against discharge spikes will also be disproportionately costly to implement. Time varying discharges create barriers to nonpoint regulation generally, whether in the form of taxes or standards. They also suggest that "dynamic" pricing and permit programs are the relevant, ideal benchmarks against which to judge the performance of nonpoint regulatory programs.
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In spite of the challenges, however, nonpoint water quality taxes are a policy issue with enough virtues-for academic commentators at least-to warrant additional thought, debate, and consideration. Importantly, empirical analysis of nonpoint tax schemes is a focus of current literature. 67 Nevertheless, the prospects for point and nonpoint source water quality taxes remain dim.
Most clearly, sources want to avoid the additional costs imposed on them by pricing schemes. 68 Moreover, the explicit pricing of pollution, and the flexibility given to sources to respond to prices, wins few fans in the environmental community. This combination of source community and environmentalist opposition has been-and likely will be-politically fatal to the water quality tax concept. This is all the more true for nonpoint sources given the potency of agriculture as a lobbying force and the diffuse, numerous nature of urban and suburban sources.
Returning to the question posed in the title, water quality taxes may be doomed, but they remain a very good idea. The ability to innovate and adapt in response to a price signal, rather than a technological mandate, will always be a powerful motivation for market-based approaches. From an environmental standpoint, pricing pollution does something that the existing regulatory system does not: namely, make polluters pay for their pollution so that the full social cost of polluting activities is reflected in the prices of the goods and services we purchase. Finally, the false dichotomy between "simple" command-and-control and "complex" pricing schemes should be resisted. Command-and-control policies present a wider range of monitoring and other administrative difficulties than is widely appreciated. Compared to current water quality regulation, water quality taxation is not orders of magnitude more difficult to implement and enforce. The challenges associated with them are simply more transparent.
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